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Competition Policy Review: Draft Report, September 2014 
Submission on patent and copyright issues 
This submission deals specifically with Section 8.1 titled “intellectual property”. 
The term “intellectual property” encompasses a range of interventions into the market, with 
quite different eligibility criteria and privileges. As a result use of this term can lead to 
imprecise thinking and unclear communication. In responding to the draft report my major 
focus is on patents, with some minor comments on copyright and very brief attention to four 
other potential impediments to the spread of innovation. 
I support the view of the Competition Policy Review draft report that the range of statutory 
interventions into markets for creative and inventive goods and services is a priority area for 
review. Such interventions can facilitate or inhibit creativity and innovation and policy 
should be developed on the basis of evidence. To date it has been based on the relative 
political influence of competing interest groups.  
I do not however agree that there should be a "framework-style review of "IP". The priority 
area in urgent need of review is the patent system where standards have fallen to very low 
levels. As I argue below I do not believe that the 2000 Intellectual Property and Competition 
Review Committee was adequate in respect of the patent system (IPCRC 2000). The patent 
system is in urgent need of a fundamental, independent, evidence-based, economic 
evaluation of the extent to which it operates to efficiently and effectively promote 
innovation which would not otherwise take place while minimising interference in the 
spread and adoption of innovation. That is, does it meet clause 5.1 of the Competition 
Principles Agreement? 
The IPCRC review was far more evidence based in respect of copyright. As major copyright 
issues have also recently been reviewed by the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC 
2014), the priority in this area is reviewing the data available for ensuring evidence-based 
policy, and taking steps to fill the gap.  
A second area meriting immediate attention is the proportionality of penalties. There are 
increasing moves for criminal provisions in "trade" treaties, so the issue of criminality in 
these statutory economic policies also needs to be reviewed ab initio. Criminality in 
copyright is an accident of history. The original copyright statutes provided a right to enter 
and search for possible infringing material – a right that was critical in an era before the 
establishment of police forces. Abuses of this right in the early twentieth century in New 
York city led to removal of this right and replacement with criminal provisions for copyright 
infringement so that enforcement by regular police forces was possible (Boldrin and Levine 
2008: chapter 2). A fundamental review of appropriate, proportionate, penalties for 
breaching patent, copyright, trademark or plant variety statutes is needed. Such a review 
should consider both penalties for infringement and penalties for undermining the law. The 
latter are almost non-existent and encourage "rights-holders" to push the boundaries of 
existing policy and law towards increasing strong privileges for "rights-holders".  
Patents, innovation and competition 
Patents attempt to encourage industrial invention by limiting competition in the 
(technological) area patented. The privileges granted allow the patent owner to prevent 
anyone else undertaking any commercial activities in the patented area, even if they have 
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independently invented the same process or product. This is a very powerful exclusive right 
and thus needs to be used parsimoniously. It is neither efficient nor effective if patents are 
granted for inventions that would be undertaken absent the patent incentive. 
This might appear to be hard to operationalise, but there is both theoretical argument 
(Bonatti and Comino 2011) and substantial evidence that patents are most needed where 
copying is fast and relatively cheap and where initial research and development (R&D) costs 
are high. In such circumstances the inventor is unlikely to have sufficient exclusive time in 
the market to recoup the cost of the R&D investment. There are empirical studies showing 
that copying is usually neither fast nor cheap (Levin et al. 1987; Mansfield, Schwartz and 
Wagner 1981). There is a vast empirical literature showing that in most industries firms 
report that patents are generally not needed to obtain a good return on investment in R&D 
(summarised in Moir 2013b: chapter 2 and López 2009). As a result the uninterrogated 
economic argument that patents are needed as knowledge can be copied without cost or 
time is simply wrong.  
Interestingly, during the period when empirical evidence has mounted showing that patents 
are generally not needed to support industrial innovation, patents have been made available 
over a wider subject matter range and for increasingly less inventive “inventions” (Mazzoleni 
and Nelson 1998). Such extensions are based on changes in patent office practices, judicially 
determined rules or trade negotiations, never on the basis of solid economic evidence.  
The major industry where patents may be justified is the chemical and pharmaceutical 
industry. While pharmaceutical industry reports of the cost of Phase III clinical trials appear 
to be substantially over-estimated (Light and Warburton 2011), nonetheless it is widely 
accepted that many useful new drugs might not be developed without patent monopolies. 
In fact the true picture is more nuanced than this – the German chemical industry achieved 
global leadership on the back of a patent system that granted patent monopolies for 
chemical processes but not for chemical products (Dutfield 2003). Unfortunately the TRIPS 
Treaty requires no discrimination between technology fields.  
There is an important second strand to the argument to intervene in the market and provide 
patent monopolies. This is that inventions are presumed to have social returns that can be 
greater than the private returns. Clearly where private returns are high, the invention can 
proceed without government assistance. But where private returns are low, but total social 
returns are high, then a society might wish to provide an incentive to induce the invention. 
An efficient and effective patent system is therefore one where patents are only granted 
where the following two conditions hold: 
· the invention would not occur absent patents; and 
· the social return exceeds the cost of the static efficiency loss from grant of the 
patent. 
This is very far from the patent system that operates in Australia today.  
Although the patent system is a major plank of innovation policy, to date it has never had a 
thorough economic review.1 The 1984 Industrial Property Advisory Committee (IPAC) review 
was billed as an economic review, but the one economist on the panel lodged a dissenting 
report saying “[t]his report does not live up to its claim to have adopted an economic 
perspective and to have applied economic criteria. …  It is constrained by the very ‘haze of 
                                                     
1 And in ten years of studying and writing about the patent system I have never found an economic evaluation 
in any country.  
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assumptions about rights and rewards for inventors, special pleading by those directly 
involved, and a plethora of legal procedures and criteria in the Patents Act’ that it deplores.” 
(IPAC 1984: 79-80). 
The Intellectual Property and Competition Review Committee (IPCRC) “reviewed” the patent 
system against Clause 5.1 of the Competition Principles Agreement that: 
“legislation should not restrict competition unless it can be demonstrated that:  
(a) the benefits of the restriction to the community as a whole outweigh the costs; and 
(b) the objectives of the legislation can only be achieved by restricting competition.” 
Unfortunately the IPCRC review assumed that the patent system required inventiveness for 
grant of a patent (IPCRC 2000). Consideration of the instructions in the Patent Examiners' 
Manual would have shown that the ordinary meaning of inventive is entirely absent from 
the rules governing patent policy and administration. Subsequent research has 
demonstrated that the quantum of inventiveness required for grant of a patent is miniscule 
– more a miniscule difference than a miniscule quantum of inventiveness (Moir 2013a; Moir 
2013b). This research is based on a scientifically selected sample of granted patents and an 
investigation of the rules which allow such uninventive "inventions" to be granted patents. 
Had the IPCRC review looked at the facts of how the patent system actually works it would 
have reached a very different conclusion. It is not, therefore, possible to say that the 
required evaluation of the patent system under the Competition Principles has yet been 
undertaken.  
In 2003 the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) found, with respect to the US patent system 
that a "plethora of presumptions and procedures tip the scales in favor of the ultimate 
issuance of a patent, once an application has been filed." (FTC 2003: 8). The same is true in 
Australia. The Patent Act 1990 assumes that every application is novel and inventive. It is 
then up to the patent examiner to refute this assertion. In fact the examiner is given the 
even narrower task of determining whether the application is obvious, not whether it fails to 
be sufficiently inventive for the dynamic benefits to exceed the static efficiency losses. 
Further, there are a large number of specific doctrines which add up to the fact that the 
word “obvious” in the patent system has a particular and narrower meaning than the 
ordinary meaning. Other rules make it almost impossible for an examiner to reject an 
application that combines two or three well-known things. For example already patented 
pharmaceuticals are regularly combined with well-known delivery mechanisms to achieve 
secondary patents which delay generic entry into the pharmaceutical market (Moir and 
Palombi 2013).2  
Another example of a change in the patent system which effectively allows the same patent 
to be granted twice is the practice of granting patents for new uses of known things. 
Speaking at the ANZAAS Conference in 1954, the then Commissioner of patents, H. R. 
Wilmot was quite specific on this issue "the discovery of an unknown property in a known 
material is not patentable, primarily because no manufacture in the sense of a physical thing 
is disclosed" (Wilmot 1954: 3). Just five years later the High Court reviewed the legal 
understanding of a "manner of manufacture" in a decision that has subsequently been 
interpreted as being that patentable subject matter is anything that can make a dollar in the 
                                                     
2 See also examples in Hazel Moir and Deborah Gleeson, "Explainer: evergreening and how big pharma keeps 
drug prices high", The Conversation, 6 November 2014 (https://theconversation.com/explainer-evergreening-
and-how-big-pharma-keeps-drug-prices-high-33623). 
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marketplace.3 This very broad interpretation of the 1959 decision has never been subjected 
to any economic review. It undermines the presumption in the mind of lawmakers that 
patents are only awarded for technological inventions and for "things that are a significant 
advance over what was known and what was available to the public."4 The lack of any 
economic evidence-based evaluation of the subject matter criterion for patent eligibility 
since NRDC has led directly to today's standard practice of granting patents for new uses of 
previously patented chemicals. But the original patent for the chemical itself restricts 
competitors from all commercial uses of the chemical during the patent period. To then 
grant a further patent for a specified use of that chemical has the character of re-patenting 
the same thing, though the second patent is narrower in scope.5 This form of double-dipping 
is a travesty of sound economic policy.  
Against this background a framework review is far from sufficient.  
What Australia’s innovators urgently need it is a thorough economic review of the patent 
system, given that patent law implements economic policy. This review needs to identify the 
types of inventions where grant of a patent is in the national interest. It should recommend 
changes needed to bring patent policy into line with providing only such patents. These 
recommendations should include changes that cannot yet be implemented because of 
international treaties to which Australia is a signatory. These latter matters could form part 
of Australia's negotiating package in future regulatory treaties.6 
Only 20 per cent of Australian innovating firms use the patent system,7 yet when 
infringement is alleged it is only innovating firms who can be sued. And the fact that a patent 
is for an uninventive invention does not mean that it cannot be used to cause economic 
damage. It is simply not good enough to say “[i]n the majority of cases the granting of an IP 
right is unlikely to raise significant competition concerns.” Patent policy has to date been 
developed in the total absence of evidence. But the lack of data on how patents are used, 
does not mean that one can claim that patents are either unlikely to be used or that they do 
not raise competition concerns. 
The lack of data appears to be deliberate – IPAC recommended in 1984 that data on patent 
use be collected when patents were renewed. No action has been taken and today, when 
over 17,000 patent monopolies are being granted each year, IPAustralia still collects no data 
on their use. While there is no direct evidence as to why Australia collects no data there is 
                                                     
3 National Research Development Corporation v Commissioner of Patents (1959) 102 CLR 252 (NRDC). 
4 Explanatory Memorandum, Intellectual Property Laws Amendment (Raising the Bar) Bill 2011, p.42. 
5 Once a new pharmaceutical product is on the market it is used by a much larger number of people than those 
involved in Phase III clinical trials. It is during this on-market phase (Phase IV) that side-effects, both positive 
and negative become apparent. While data on these might need to be presented to the Therapeutic Goods 
Authority to gain specific marketing approval for the new positive side-effect, the costs of doing this are far less 
than for Phase III clinical trials. There is usually informal use of the product for the new treatment prior to any 
formal registration of the product for the new use.  
6 What go by the name of "free trade agreements" are no longer this. They reach far into the realm of domestic 
policy, often in extraordinarily pedantic detail. They are more appropriately referred to as regulatory treaties. 
For a discussion of what a balanced patent policy might look like see Moir 2014.  
7 In 2004-05 the Australian National Innovation Survey showed that 34 per cent of Australian firms were 
innovating (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2005: 12). About 2,100 firms were introducing "new to the world" 
innovations, and about 2,800 firms "new to the Australia" innovations. It is these firms that might be expected 
to own patents. Data on methods used to protect intellectual property are not provided by type of innovation. 
For all innovating firms, 3.8 per cent used patents. If all reported patent use is among new to the 
world/Australia innovators, then about one in five such firms use the patent system. 
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evidence from the USA that the beneficiaries of patent systems act to prevent independent 
evidence being collected.8  
There are few data on how granted patents are used, but we know from the many reports 
on the outcomes of court cases that patents for very uninventive (to the ordinary person) 
inventions are upheld by courts and used to suppress competitors. Court cases are known to 
be only the tip of the iceberg in terms of patent use. Many innovative firms receive regular 
solicitor's letters advising them that they are infringing a patent. These firms then have to 
divert resources into providing a solid response to ensure that the action is cut off at the 
beginning. Indeed this is a major reason that firms take out patents – to threaten counter-
suit in the event of alleged infringement (Cohen, Nelson and Walsh 2000). Patents beget 
patents.  
The fact that a patented invention is uninventive is does not prevent it from causing 
economic harm. In 2013 Bayer successfully sued Generic Health Pty Ltd for infringement of 
its patent for yet another low dose combination contraceptive pill.9 Even in the USA, which 
also has very low standards for the grant of patents, this "invention" had been found to be 
obvious.10 Indeed as oral contraceptives were first marketed in Australia in 1961 and there 
are at least 83 alternative products on the market,11 mostly for low dose combinations, it is 
hard to envisage much inventiveness in another such product. Similarly Catuity, who had 
independently invented a dynamic storage card for use on transport systems, was found to 
have infringed Welcome's dynamic storage loyalty card. The essence of the invention was 
use of dynamic storage on a consumer loyalty card. All parties to the dispute agreed that 
dynamic storage was well-known to IT workers. However it was not known to consumer 
loyalty workers so Heerey J ruled that the disputed patent was valid and infringed.12   
As the current broken patent system is currently being written into the planned Trans Pacific 
Partnership Agreement (TPPA) in great and pedantic detail, a thorough economic review of 
the patent system is urgently needed. If this is not undertaken now it will be too late as we 
will have signed away our right to reform this broken system.13 
There is considerable evidence that Australia's patent system probably breaches Article 7 of 
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs): 
                                                     
8 Kahin (2003) reports that, subsequent to the State Street case the White House Office of Science and 
Technology Policy commissioned the Science and Technology Policy Institute at RAND to undertake a study on 
software patent quality and business effects. He notes that "it was suspended at the request of a U.S. 
multinational company concerned that the study would undercut efforts to secure greater international 
acceptance of software patents". Kahin also reports that the American patent bar successfully lobbied to 
remove a US Government Accountability Office (GAO) study of business method patents from the American 
Inventors Protection Act of 1999. The FTC recommendation most strongly rejected by the Intellectual Property 
Owners Association is recommendation 10 for increased evidence based analysis of the patent system (Bessen 
and Meurer 2008: 293-4).  
9 Bayer Pharma Aktiengesellschaft v Generic Health Pty Ltd (No 2) [2013] FCA 279.  
10 Bayer Healthcare v. Watson Pharmaceuticals, CAFC 2013 12-1397.  
11 Such data are hard to trace for Australia. However in respect of the large US market, MedlinePlus, a service 
of the US National Library of Medicine lists 83 different brand names as at 28 April 2013 
(http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/druginfo/meds/a601050.html#brand-name-2). 
12 Welcome Real-Time SA v Catuity Inc [2001] FCA 445. A database on Australian patent cases that have 
reached courts was created a few years ago – but unfortunately the most important information – the size of 
penalties and other costs – was not included (Weatherall and Jensen 2005).  
13 See Hazel Moir, “How trade agreements are locking in a broken patent system”, 20 0ctober 2014 at 
https://theconversation.com/how-trade-agreements-are-locking-in-a-broken-patent-system-32564.  
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"The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should 
contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and 
dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of 
technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic 
welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations."  
There is currently only one element of the patent system that acts in favour of users of new 
technology – that a granted patent cannot be presumed valid (patent act, S.20). Even this 
one small element of balance is currently under attack in proposed Article H.2.3 of the draft 
TPPA chapter on "intellectual property".14 
A framework review of all "intellectual property" is inadequate to ensure that the principles 
in clause 5.1 of the Competition Principles Agreement are met in respect of the patent 
system. Australia needs and deserves a specific, thorough and detailed review of patent 
policy. Such a review must be independent and evidence based. It should focus on the 
economic effect of the patent system. It should make recommendations to ensure that the 
patent system is parsimonious, efficient and effective. If, as many in the patent community 
believe, some 80 to 85 per cent of granted patents are "rubbish",15 then it is more than time 
they were removed and the system changed to prevent such abuses of regulatory 
intervention in the market. As shown above even "rubbish" patents can cause economic 
harm, and in the pharmaceutical field there is clear evidence that generic entry is delayed by 
low quality patents, to the substantial cost of both the Australian tax payer and the generics 
industry (Moir and Palombi 2013).  
Copyright policy 
The copyright system is in less need of urgent review, though here too policy is largely based 
on argument rather than evidence. Indeed, much of the evidence put forward by interested 
parties is highly suspect, particularly evidence on economic losses caused by unauthorised 
uses.16 Despite the lack of policy-relevant data on the benefits to creators compared to the 
benefits to distributors from the copyright system, the 2000 IPCRC analysis was far sounder 
than that for patents, as there were no inaccurate assumptions as to how the system 
worked. The ALRC has also recently reviewed digital copyright issues (ALRC 2014). 
Nonetheless most discussions of patent policy avoid the most important question – does the 
system as it operates now actually benefit creators and encourage creation?  
The reality – that as currently shaped, copyright policy acts more in the interests of 
distributors than creators – rarely shapes copyright policy. Instead we have seen copyright 
policy increasingly tilted in favour of distributors. Although we have all been subject to 
substantial propaganda over the past 30 or more years, the fact is that when a film is copied 
without authorisation it is the distributors not the creators who loose income.17 The 
extension of copyright for a further 20 years after the author’s death is widely known to be 
due to lobbying to prevent Disney’s Mickey Mouse from falling into the public domain. 
Australia granted such an extension in 2004 when it signed the Australia-United States Free 
Trade Agreement (AUSFTA), despite evidence of the high cost (Dee 2005). Now, only ten 
years later the USA is again pushing for a further 20 years extension in the copyright term in 
                                                     
14 2014 version. Available at https://www.wikileaks.org/tpp-ip2/#article_e4. 
15 Personal communication from long-serving member of the patent community.  
16 The Joint Standing Committee on treaties' report 126 on the proposed Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
considered that the evidence of a significant problem was weak (see discussion at pp 9-11). 
17 See the substantial data on financial benefits in the Australian film industry in Court 2013.  
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the context of the TPPA. Again, it is clear that such an extension is not in Australia's interest 
as we buy more copyrighted content from overseas than we sell.  
The priority need for the copyright system is the development of better data on returns to 
creators and distributors. A start has been made on this for the film industry (Court 2013), 
but similar data are needed for the many other types of creation that receive automatic 
blanket global copyright "protection". Once such data are available a thorough economic 
review will be possible.  
In the meantime there are two issues that need attention.  
Firstly, there is an imbalance in the rights provided to authors and the rights provided on 
sale of a copy of the work. Copyright operates globally, and typing the © sign in the 
frontispiece of a published work is all that is needed to achieve full copyright privileges in all 
countries that are signatories to the Berne Convention. In contrast, particularly in regard to 
digital copies, sellers usually limit use to a particular geographic region. For example if the 
owner of an Amazon kindle moves countries, Amazon will lock up all the items that the 
kindle owner has purchased, on the grounds that Amazon is insufficiently powerful to 
negotiate global copyright with publishers.18 As is well known, the distributors of films have 
coded the copies they sell so that if the owner of the copy moves between regions they have 
difficulty viewing the copies they legitimately own.  
A further issue in regard to the balance between rights and privileges is the layering of 
copyright, digital rights management technologies and technological protection measures. 
Effectively the used of various forms of encryption both undermines the economic argument 
for copyright protection and reduces the rights passing to the purchaser on acquisition of a 
legitimate copy. This again is a form of double dipping and needs careful review.  
And finally, the fact that registration is not required – the feature that substantially delayed 
US entry into the Berne Convention – is highly questionable. The lack of registration directly 
causes the major problem of orphan works. Given the importance of disseminating cultural 
materials this provision needs urgent review in the context of considering the balance of 
rights and obligations between creators and users of copyrighted materials.  
The second major issue raised by copyright is criminality. Copyright is a policy designed to 
encourage creators and artists by providing them with economic rights to prevent unlawful 
copying. The damage done by unlawful copying is economic, and it is up to the copyright 
owner to take civil action to recover the loss. It is therefore hard to see why penalties should 
include criminal penalties. Indeed such penalties are an accident of history, as outlined at 
the beginning of this submission. Criminal penalties for copyright infringement are 
disproportionate and inappropriate. There should be an urgent review of criminality in both 
copyright and other industrial property interventions to identify and limit these. While 
criminal penalties might be appropriate where a court order has been contravened, the 
simple act of unauthorised use, on whatever scale, should be penalised by making good the 
economic damage done. And no more.  
Plants 
Australia first introduced "protection" for plant varieties in 1987, then amended this act in 
1994 to reflect changes in the 1978 and 1991 versions of UPOV. Only new, distinctive, stable 
and uniform varieties can be protected under the Plant Breeders Rights Act (PBRA). The 
                                                     
18 Email from Amazon to the author. This condition is not clearly spelled out on the page where kindle 
purchases are made.  
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original objective of the legislation was to encourage plant breeding efforts in Australia. 
Unlike the patent system the PBRA specifically provides for user access to protected 
varieties, including farmer's privileges. But plants are also patentable, largely because in 
Australia almost anything can be patented. Any review of "protection" systems for plants 
needs to consider how the patent and PBR systems interact and the impact of plant patents 
on farmer's privileges.  
Trade Marks 
Australia's trademarks legislation was substantially rewritten in the Trade Marks Act 1995, as 
a result of Australia's accession to the Madrid system for the international registration of 
marks (commonly known as the Madrid Protocol). Like the Patent Cooperation Treaty, this 
provides a simplified path for a company to register a mark globally.  
The trade marks system has substantially changed character – from protection of producers 
and buyers from counterfeit products, to a marketing tool. Instead of being limited to simple 
logos or words, trademarks can now be acquired for sounds, smells, colours, shapes and 
phrases. It is not, however, clear what economic harm is caused by this substantial shift to a 
marketing character. Whether more recent trade negotiation moves to globalise national 
systems of "well-known" marks is welfare-enhancing is unclear. So too is the expansion of 
trade marks to geographic indicators.  
Trade Secrets 
As there are moves to amend the terms of trade secrets in regulatory treaties such as the 
TPPA, there is a need for some economic consideration of how trade secrets law works and 
its economic impact on both competition and innovation.  
Non-compete clauses 
Non-compete clauses as often included in contracts of employment. Such clauses are not 
allowed under California's constitution, except in a small set of specific circumstances. 
Boldrin and Levine point to research suggesting that the lack of non-compete clauses in 
California is a major reason for the success of Silicon Valley (Boldrin and Levine 2008: 
chapter 8). Non-compete clauses are anti-competitive in their intent, and can impact 
negatively on the establishment of innovative businesses. An economic review of how such 
clauses operate in Australia would be of value. 
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